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to specific duties whose ad valorem equivalent was inversely related to the price level. This paper
finds that import price fluctuations easily dominate commercial policies (changes in rates of import
duty) in bringing about changes in the average U.S. tariff from 1865-1973. About three-quarters of
the post-Smoot Hawley decline in U.S, tariffs, for example, can be attributed to higher import prices,
the remainder to negotiated reductions in tariff rates.
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I. Introduction
A curious feature of the U,S. tariff code from 1789 to the present has been its mixture of
ad valorem duties, specific duties, and compound duties (which are a combination of both). 1 It
has long been recognized that changes in import prices affect the average ad valorem equivalent
of the specific duties; itiation (deflation) will reduce (increase) the ad valorem equivalent of the
specific duties and thus tiect import demand, The use of specific duties has meant that, during
certain periods, price-level changes have had an important impact on the average tariff.2 What
remains unclear is the degree to which fluctuations in import prices and adjustments to tariff rates
(enacted by Congress or resulting from trade negotiations) have been responsible for movements
in the average tariff over the course of U. S. history.
This paper attempts to determine the relative importance of import prices and tariff rate
adjustments to changes in the average ad valorem U.S. tariff from the Civil War until the early
1970s. This paper finds that import price movements account for a much greater proportion of
the change in the average U, S. tariff than commercial policies that directly altered tariff rates. ‘
About three-quarters of the post-Smoot Hawley decline in the average tti, for example, can be
attributed to higher import prices and only about a qutier due to cuts in import duties. As a
result, it maybe misleading to attribute or interpret observed movements in average tariffs as
1 Ad valorem duties are assessed as a percentage of the value of imports whereas specific
duties are a nominal dollar amount per imported quantity.
2 This aspect of the tariff has been explored in the post-Civil War period by McGuire
(1990), the interwar period by Crucini (1994), and the 1970s by Van Cott and Wipf (1983).
.mostly reflecting changes in commercial policy.
Section II discusses general issues relating to tariff measurement and the role of (and
rationale for) specific duties in the U.S. tariff code. Specific duties were levied on roughly two-
thirds of dutiable U.S. imports for much of the century tier the Civil War and were justified on
administrative grounds (for simplicity and to prevent underinvoicing). Section 111develops an
econometric model of the determinants of the average ad valorem tariff rate from 1865-1973 and
uses the estimated parameters to distinguish the effects of import prices and commercial policies
on the average tariff. Import prices consistently account for over two-thirds of the major swings
in the tariff during the twentieth century, implying that passive changes in the tariff due to price
movements have been more important than active changes in tariff rates. Section IV briefly
examines the pre-Civil War period from 1821-60 and finds that price-level effects on the average
tti were much less important. Section V discusses some of the implications of the results.
II. Tariff Measurement and Specific Duties
The most frequently used measure of the average ad valorem tariff rate is the ratio of total
revenue from import duties to the value of dutiable imports. Figure 1 presents these data for the
United States from 1865 -1973.3 This readily available series is usually interpreted as reflecting
the average height of the tariff and thus the stance of a-count~’s commercial policy. The high
tariff period from 1865-1913, for example, is said to reflect the political dominance of
protectionist Republicans. The brief period of liberalization under the Democrats around World
War I was followed by a return to protection in which the Republican Fordney-McCumber and
3 Sources for all the data used in this study are described in the data appendix.3
Smoot-Hawley tariffs of 1922 and 1930 are thought to have pushed the average tariff over 50
percent. Successive negotiations under the Reciprocal Trade Agreement Actof1934 andthe
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) tier 1947, it is believed, then brought the tariff
down to about 10 percent.
~ameasure of the`` average'' tariff, ttisratio hasseverd conceptual shoficomings. The
most serious drawback is its downward bias as a indicator of tariffs: imports subject to high or
prohibitive tariffs receive little or no weight in the index. This problem can be surmounted by the
laborious task of calculating the average tariff with some appropriate weights other than the
current value of imports and keeping these weights fixed over periods in which tariff policy
changes.4 Yet this bias may not be so extensive as to make the tariff revenue measure completely
unreliable. Lerdau (1957) calculated an average U.S. tariff index annually from 1909-46 using
weights from the wholesale price index. He reported a correlation of 0.88 (which I was able to
wnfirm) between his index and tariff revenue as a share of dutiable imports. This correlation, he
concludes (p. 239), “in view of the absence of a significant trend and in view of the considerable
amplitude of the fluctuations, must be considered surprisingly high. The use of this cruder index
as an indication of changes in the tariff over time is therefore fw less suspect than it would appear
to be on purely theoretical grounds.”5
4 See, however, the recent approach propo~ed by Anderson and Neary (1994).
5 Other fixed-weight indicators of tariff changes yield results that are just slightly higher
than those evident from the tariff revenue measure. For the Smoot-Hawley tariff of 1930, for
example, the tariff revenue measure increased 17.4 percent between the second halves of 1929
and 1930, a fixed weight calculation by the U.S. Tariff Commission suggests an average increase
of 22.7 percent, while Lerdau’s index rises 21.0 percent between 1929 and 1931, See Irwin
(1996), pp. 3-4.
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As an indicator of commercial policy, in terms of legislative or executive changes in rates
of import duty, this measure of the average ad valorem tariff rate suffers from spurious volatility:
the series moves, sometimes substantially, during periods in which there are no changes in the
actual tariff rates. This problem is ofien thought to be less serious than the bias noted above, but
could be more serious if the aim of using the average tariff measure is to identifi the effects of
commercial policy. This volatility could be due to the dependence of the ad valorem equivalent of
specific duties on the level of import prices. That fluctuations in impoti prices are a plausible
source of variation in the average tariff is also illustrated in Figure 1, which includes an index of
U.S. impofi prices. Large changes in import prices are inversely related to major swings in the
tariff (the correlation between the two series is -0.93). The substantial increase in import prices
during World War I and during and just afier World War II coincides with dramatic reductions in
the average tariff, for example, while plunging import prices in the early 1920s and again in early
1930s are associated with large increases in the tariff.
Is the highly negative correlation between import prices and the average tariff explained by
the use of specific duties? Although data on the importance of specific duties in the U, S. tariff
code is difficult to come by, Table 1 presents some limited information compiled from various
sources. The table indicates that, from the late 1860s until the 195os, roughly two-thirds of
dutiable U.S. imports were subject to specific or compound duties (with compound duties usually
constituting less than 5 percent of dutiable imports), This proportion fell to half by the mid- 1960s
and to less than 40 percent by the early 1970s. Specific duties raised approximately 40-50 percent
of tariff revenue from the late 1860s until 1920, but this share shot up in the early 1920s. By the5
1970s, about a quarter of tariff revenue was derived from specific and compound duties.4 The
Tokyo Round of GATT negotiations, concluded in 1979, converted manyspecificdutiesto d
*duties intheu-s. tafiffcode.
What explains the heavy reliance on specific duties?’ The main rationale was apparently
administrative simplicity, to avoid the tricky issue of valuing imports and to prevent
underinvoicing fraud. However, just as the political parties differed as to the proper height of the
tariff for much of this period (Republicans favoring high, protective tariffs, Democrats advocating
moderate, revenue tariffs), they differed in their preference for specific and ad valorem duties.
From the Merrill Act of 1861, Republicans ensured that most import duties were specific, not ~
h. In 1888, the House of Representatives (controlled byDemocrats)triedto includemore
ad valorem duties in the tariff code, but the Senate (controlled by Republicans) prevented this
action.
The Democrats incorporated more ad valorem rates into the Wilson-German tariff of
1894, but Republicans promptly reversed this move three years later. Democrats again included
more ad valorem duties in the Underwood tariffof1913. Table 1 indicates that the share of
specific or compound duties fell from 63 to 42 percent of dutiable imports between 1913 and
1914. But the Republican Fordney-McCumber tariff of 1922 restored and extended the use of
specific duties. These specific duties were locked into the tariff code by the Smoot-Hawley tariff
d Roessler (1977) reports that 34 percent of the lines in the U, S. tariff code had
duties in 1973.
7 The following paragraphs drawonTaussig(1931) and U.S. Congress (1909),
specific
a
mmpilation of numerous Congressional committee reports “ontariff legisla~ion during the late
nineteenth century.
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of 1930, the last tariff act passed by Congress. This act fixed specific duties at nominal amounts
circa 1930, and hence their ad valorem equivalent was ripe for an increase through deflation or
erosion through itiation in subsequent years.
What issues were involved in the debate over the merits of specific and ad valorem duties?
The main Republican argument against ad valorem duties, what they once called “the objection . .
. most important,” was the incentive given to importers to underinvoice: “Inasmuch as the duty
depends on the price, a cheat on the price is a cheat on the duty.”a Specific duties avoided this
problem, which Republicans evidently believed to be rampant, and “have been advocated by all
our Secretaries of the Treasury” (with one exception) for their “simplicity and certainty in
execution.”9
Democrats pointed out that specific duties too could be subject to evasion and proposed
coupling ad valorem duties with strong enforcement measures. 10The main Democratic argument
against specific duties and in favor of ad valorem duties was equity: that fixed nominal duties
placed a heavier burden on lower priced items in any given tariff category and therefore
* U.S. Congress (1913), p. lvii, and U.S. Congress (1909), p. 300. “Through
undervaluations [ad valorem duties] invite evasions of the law and reward dishonest importers,
while they destroy the businesses alike of honest importers and domestic manufacturers” and
enable the fraudulent importer to “escape his fair share of taxation.” U, S. Congress (1909), p. 52,
and U.S. Congress (1913), p. Ivii.
9 Meanwhile, according to Republicans, the ad valorem tariff “has been condemned by the
experience of every commercial nation in the world, by the judgment of those who have been
intrusted with the responsibility of customs administration, and by honest importers and
merchants, as well as by intelligent political economists and legislators of every shade of economic
belief” U.S. Congress (1909), p. 52.
10 Specific duties require more tariff classifications and “permit slight changes in industrial
processes made for the purpose of shifting goods from one classification into another, and thereby
avoid the necessity of paying a higher rate of duty.” U.S. Congress (1913), p. xxxii.
.7
constituted a regressive tax on consumers.’1 Republicans did not dispute that specific duties were
regressive, but saw a silver lining in their “beneficial tendency to exclude from the country
inferior, adulterated, and worthless goods.”]2 Democrats also believed the lack of transparency of
specific duties abetted excessive protectionism. 13
Both parties recognized that the ad valorem equivalent of specific duties was inversely
related to import prices, but thought this a secondary consideration to judge from the
Congressional committee reports on the various tariff bills. Republicans liked the protective
insurance provided by specific duties against low prices. “When business is depressed and foreign
prices abnormally low, when foreign competition is most to be dreaded, and when a defensive
barrier is most needed by domestic producers, then ad valorem rates are lowest, production is
reduced, and depression intensified. ” Democrats saw an “injustice” in this feature of a specific
duty in that it “ftils to take account of fluctuations in value, and it therefore imposes a relatively
low rate when prices are high and a relative high rate when prices are low, notwithstanding the
11 “A duty which taxes according to kind, pound, weight, measure, or the like, without
regard to value, always oppressed the less wealthy consumer and lightens the burden on his richer
fellow-citizen.” U.S. Congress (1909), p. 292. Democrats once complained that a Republican
effort “to restore specific instead of ad valorem rates simply means, no matter what pretenses may
be set up, that the goods used by the poor shall be taxed out of all proportion to those used by the
rich,” U.S. Congress (1909), p. 132.
12 U.S. Congress (1909), p. 54. :
13 A specific duty “strongly tends to mask the real character and burden of the tariff, and
thereby to keep the consumer who pays the cost in ignorance of his real contributions.” U.S.
Congress (191 3), p. xxxii. Democrats once complained that the shift toward more specific duties
“render it difficult for the minority to approximate with satisfactory certainty the extent to which
tariff taxation is increased or diminished upon the articles included in the various schedules or
what effect these changes will probably have upon the amounts of revenues to result from such
changes.” U.S. Congress (1909), p, 123,
.undesirability of such a method.”14
Whatever their rationale, specific duties have clearly loomed large in the U. S. tariff code
over the past century. The next question is one of determining the extent to which changes in the
tariff arise from changes in import prices, commercial policies, or other sources of variation.
III. Changes in the Tari~ Prices or Policies?
The aim of this section is to determine the degree to which the changes in U. S. tariffs
observed in Figure 1 are due to impofi price movements or to changes in the actual rates of
import duty.
To motivate the issue conceptually, suppose there are two classes of imports, Ml subject
to ad valorem duties and Mz subject to specific duties (and their associated prices, pl and pz). The
average ad valorem tariff rate r is then defined as (tplM1 + sMz)/pM, or (1-a)t + as/pz, where t is
the ad valorem tariff, s is the specific duty, a is the weight of imports (by value) subject to specific
duties, and pM is the total value of (dutiable) imports, It is straightfomard to show that if all
imports are subject to ad valorem duties alone (a = O), then a change in import prices will not
afTect the average tariff (i.e., 13t/dp = O). If all imports are specific (a = 1), then d~/dp = -s/p2.
When imports are subject to a combination of duties, and assuming for simplicity that pz is
perfectly correlated with the overall import price index p, the result is dT/dp = -as/p2.
Plugging values into this last formula can give an indication of the expected magnitude of
the elasticity of the average tariff with respect to import prices, Table 1 suggests that a can be
approximated as .65, while the mean value of T (from 1865-1973, multiplied by 100) is 34. Data
14 U.S, Congress (1909), p. 52, and U.S. Congress (1913), p. xxxii.
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on s/p, the ad valorem equivalent of specific duties, is less clear: U.S, Tariff Commission
estimates for select years during 1913-25 range from a high of 43.06 in 1914 to a low of 10.45 in
1920. The elasticity of the average tariff rate with respect to import prices -- calculated as
(&/T)/(ap/p) = -as/pr -- would be about -0,48 ifs/p = 25, -0.67 ifs/p = 35, -0.86 if slp = 45.
To separate out the effects of import prices and commercial policies on the average tariff,
the econometric approach proposed here is to estimate the following equation:
ti = PO+ ~lln(p) + Z~jDji + ui,
where Z ~jDj is a series of dummy variables representing various tariff regimes. The semi-log
specification allows the elasticity of the tariff with respect to price to be easily determined by
dividing PI by the mean of r. This specification also preserves an easy interpretation of the
coefficients on the dummy variables in terms of their impact of the average tariff level.
The problem with this specification is that import prices enter directly into the calculation
of ~i and therefore pi and ui will be negatively correlated, While this works to reduce ~1, thereby
understating the role of prices, it can be corrected by using an appropriate instrument for pi.
Because relative price movements between domestic and imported goods tend not to be ve~
large, domestic wholesale prices might be expected to be a usefil instrument.
Table 2 presents econometric results from various regressions in which the dependent
variable is always the average ad valorem tariff (multiplied by 100), The sample consists of 109
observations from the years 1865-1973.15 There are 12 dummy variables representing
15 The sample ends just after the Kennedy Round of tariff reductions had been
implemented, Mer 1973, import prices explode while there is virtually no change in the average
tariff because inflation over the post-war period had eroded the specific duties to negligible levels.
See also Van Cott and Wipf (1983).
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administrative changes in tariff rates. The first nine variables are acts of legislation passed
Congress in which rates of import duty in the tariff code were changed. These span the
by the
(unnamed) Tariff Act of 1872 to the Smoot-Hawley tariff of 1930, the last time Congress directly
changed the schedule of import duties. The last three dummy variables represent rate reductions
resulting from executive agreements with foreign countries: the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act
of 1934 (considered here to be effective from 1936), the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(from 1948), and the Kennedy Round (from 1968).”
In the first regression (column 1) of Table 2, the dummy variables representing tariff
legislation and negotiated trade agreements are taken to be the only factors determining the
average tariff. The coefficients indicate the deviation of the average tariff during a given period
from the regression intercept. For example, when the McKinley twiff was in effect from 1890-
1893, the average tariff was about 47.5 percent (PO+ j3~. The Democratic Wilson-German
tariff (in effect from 1894-96) dropped the tariff nearly 6 percentage points (~~~ - ~~ to 41.6
percent, although the Republicans prompted erased this reduction with the Dingley tariff (1897-
1908). The Underwood tariff (19 13-21) pushed the average tariff to 28.5 percent, a dramatic 13
percentage point drop from the Payne-Aldrich tariff (1909-1 912), or 9 percentage points from the
Dingley tariff. According to these results, the Fordney-McCumber tariff raised duties about 10
percentage points while Smoot-Hawley added another 11 percentage points, pushing the tariff up
to an average 50 percent. The RTM brought about a 17 percentage point tariff reduction (to 33
‘c While the RTAA involved negotiations with numerous countries over several years, the
most important tariff reductions were implemented in 1936-38, with virtually no negotiations
thereafter. Similarly, while three GATT negotiating rounds were held between the first at Geneva
in 1947 and the Kennedy Round (1962-67), they were held mainly to add new members and
resulted in negligible reductions in U,S. tariffs.11
percent), the GATT added another 21 percentage point reduction (to 12 percent), and the
Kemedy Round another 2percentage points to10percent. Butinattributing allchanges inthe
tariff to rate changes and none to import price fluctuations, this regression attributes too much to
these acts of policy.
The regression in column 2 introduces import prices. The coefficient on the log of import
prices is negative, reflecting the inverse relationship between import prices and the ad valorem
equivalent of specific duties, and is highly significant with a t-ratio of over 10. Import prices
boost the explained variation of tariffs (adjusted R2) from 0.94 to 0.98. The coefficient on import
prices implies an elasticity of the average tariff with respect to import prices of -0.61, within the
expected range calculated above. This elasticity indicates that a 1 percent increase in import
prices will reduce the average tariff by 0.61 percent. Consequently, changes in import prices can
bring about substantial changes in the average tariff, particularly in view of the magnitude of the
observed swings in import prices.
The addition of import prices also changes the sign, magnitude, and significance of several
of the commercial policy dummy variables as prices absorb what was wrongly
changes in tariff rates in the initial regression. For example, the coefficient on
attributed to
Underwood falls
from -19.0 to -15.3, implying a 6 percentage point tariff reduction from Payne-Aldrich rather than
the 13 percent estimated without import prices. Similarly, the coefficient on the GATT period
falls from -35.4 to -21.6, suggesting a modest 5 percentage point reduction in tariffs beyond
import price increases rather than the 21 percent reduction mentioned earlier.
As previously noted, however, import prices maybe correlated with the error term,
biasing ~1downward. The regression in column 3 uses U.S. wholesale prices as an instrument for12
import prices. IV estimation raises the coefficient on price to an implied elasticity of-0.67, There
is little change in the size or significance of the commercial policy dummy variables from the
previous specification, There are indications of autocorrelation, and
bias it results in less efficient estimates. The regression in column 4,
while this does not introduce
which instruments for import
prices and estimates the equation using Cochrane-Orcutt generalized least squares, yields virtually
an identical elasticity estimate. 17
Figure 2 plots the. actual tariff and predicted tariff from the column 1 regression (which
includes just commercial policies) and the actual tariff and the predicted tariff from the column 3
regression (which includes commercial policies and import prices), The top panel illustrates how
si~ficant variation in the tariff is not captured by Congressional or negotiated tariff policies
alone. The addition of import prices, shown in the bottom panel, improves the fit of the model
accounting for important variations in the tariff that the commercial policy variables could not.
by
The regression in column 3 can be used to decompose the relative contribution of import
prices and commercial policies to four dramatic swings in the average tariff -- the increase from
38.1 percent in 1873 to 52.4 percent in 1899, the subsequent decrease to 16.4 percent in 1920,
the following increase to 59.1 percent in 1932, and finally the decrease to 11.6 percent in 1954.
Tables 3 and 4 present results from the following exercise: using the estimated coefficients from
the column 3 regression, calculate the predicted tariff holding import prices constant (but allowing
:
the tariff acts to continue), and then again holding the initial tariff in place (but allowing import
prices to fluctuate), In other words, calculate the predicted tariff between 1873-99, 1899-1920,
1920-32, and 1932-51 assuming, first, no change in import prices and then, second, no change in
17 In a first-difference specification
.
(not reported), the implied elasticity is -0,53.13
tariff rates within the period under consideration. Table 3 shows the predicted tariff and the
forecast standard error (in terms of the 95 percent confidence interval), The first thing to note is
that import prices and commercial policies are not offsetting but are reinforcing influences on the
average tariff. That is, the average tariff fell during 1899-1920 and 1932-54 due both to
reductions in tariff rates and rising import prices, with the opposite the case in 1873-99 and 1920-
32.
Table 4 shows the relative contribution of import prices and commercial policies to the
tariff. The model does not fit the trough and peak of the tariff well in 1873-99, but does indicate
that the tariffs rise was almost entirely due to falling import prices. The results from 1899-1920
indicate that about three-quarters of the almost 70 percent fall in the tariff can be attributed to
rising import prices. Had there been no change in import prices, legislative tariff changes would
have resulted in ordy a 20 percent drop in the tariff. One problem with considering the
counterfactual in this way is that the timing and extent of changes brought about by tariff
legislation may be dependent upon changes in prices. If import price inflation had not significantly
reduced the average tariff, for example, then perhaps the legislated tariff reductions would have
been more substantial.
With this caveat in find, the results are similar for the dramatic tariff increase observed
over 1920-32. Over two-thirds of the i~crease can be attributed to falling import prices during
the early 1920s and again in the early 1930s. 18 Legislated tariff changes, the Fordney-McCumber
tti of 1922 and the Smoot-Hawley tariff of 1930, raised the tariff only about 44 percent
18 This result is close to the Irwin (1996) estimate on the relative contributions of the
Smoot-Hawley rates and deflation to the tariffs rise during 1929-32.
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according to these results. Another remarkable finding is that most (again roughly two-thirds) of
the subsequent drop in the tariff from 1932-54 can be attributed to rising import prices. The
RTAA and the GATT made important contributions to tariff reduction, but it was mostly
accomplished by rising import prices during the 1940s and early 1950s. Furthermore, the average
tariff was quite low, about 11 percent, by the early 1950s and was significantly reduced again only
in the early 1970s (to about 5-6 percent) when import prices skyrocketed. Table 4 also reports
that, over the postwar period from 1945-67, higher import prices account for over 80 percent of
the fall in tariffs.
The U, S. Tariff Commission recognized that the erosion of specific duties during the
1940s contributed significantly to tariff reduction. In a report published just tier the formation of
the GATT, the USTC (1948, p. 18) obsemed that “prices of import goods have risen greatly
during the last two decades, and this fact alone would have cause a marked reduction in the
average rate of duties actually collected in recent years compared with earlier years because of the
effects of higher prices on the ad valorem equivalents of the specific and compound duties.
(Imports subject to such duties together account for about two-thirds of total dutiable imports.)”
The USTC (1948, pp. 19-20) also attempted to determine the relative importance of trade
agreements and higher import prices in reducing the U. S. tariff from 1930-33 to 1948:
“Two major factors have been chiefly (if not wholly) responsible for this reduction in the
average rate of duty -- the trade agreements concessions and the advance in prices of
articles subject to specific or compound duties. (Changes in the composition of imports
may have affected the averages to some extent, but the direction of the effect is not
known.) It is impossible to determine exactly the relative importance of these two main
factors, but it seems probable that they have been not far from equal in their effects.”
The USTC then presented a crude calculation to substantiate the judgment that higher import15
prices and negotiated duty reductions contributed equally in bringing the average tariff to its 1948
level.
The econometric model
effects of trade agreements and
estimated here cofirms the USTC’s judgment about the relative
higher import prices for the period they considered (1930-33 to
1948). The coefficients from the column 3 regression in Table 2 imply that the RTAA and GATT
(holding import prices constant) would have reduced the tariff by 34 percent from 1931 (close to
the average 1930-33) to 1948, while higher import prices (holding the Smoot-Hawley tariff in
place) would have reduced the tariff by 32 percent. Thus, trade agreements contributed just as
much as higher import prices (in fact slightly more) to tariff reduction from the early 1930s to
1948.19
The changes in 1947-48 alone dramatize the impact of higher import prices and lower
negotiated duties on the average tariff. The USTC (1948, p. 18) calculated that had the tariff cuts
from the first GATT round in Geneva (finalized in October 1947, implemented in January 1948)
been applied to actual imports in 1947, the average tariff would have declined21 percent, from
19.4 percent to 15.3 percent. The average tariff in 1948 turned out to be 13,9 percent and higher
import prices filly account for the difference, Import prices rose 10.5 percent between 1947 and
1948, which -- given our estimated elasticity of-0.67 -- would have reduced the tariff by 7.0
percent. Applying both the 21 percent reduction due to the GATT negotiations and the 7 percent
reduction due to higher import prices to the 1947 tariff of 19.4 percent yields exactly 13.9
19 The calculations in Tables 3-4 attribute more to rising import prices because they start
from the tariff peak in 1932 and end in the mid- 1950s, allowing more time for higher import
prices to reduce the tariff firther below its 1948 level. By the chosen endpoint of 1954, import
price inflation had stabilized and the average tariff leveled off at about 10-11 percent, where it
remained until the early 1970s.
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percent. Sointhis onepivotal year, filly athirdofthe U.S.tariffreduction wasdue to higher
import prices. Over time, of course, the cumulative effect of higher import prices dominated the
sporadic, negotiated rate reductions in bringing about lower U.S. ttis afier 1932.
Because it was widely believed that a return to the early 1930s-style deflation could not be
ruled out after the war, Congress and import-competing interests probably did not filly anticipate
the inflation-induced reduction in tariffs. The USTC (1948, p. 20) thought it “impossible to
forecast, even roughly, the prices of imported goods a few years hence.” Yet import prices rose
81.4 percent between 1945 and 1955, most of which occurred in the five years after the end of the
war, making the lower tariff a fait accomDli by 1950. Were policymakers aware of the erosion of
specific duties due to import price inflation? The USTC’S discussion was not buried deep in its
report, but neither was it highlighted. During the late 1940s and early 1950s, trade policy debates
in Congress mainly focused on the type of constraints that should be included in legislation
extending the President’s negotiating authority. I have been unable to find evidence that Congress
was general] y aware or deeply concerned about the erosion of the specific duties, as might be
suggested by proposals to offset the impact of inflation by enacting higher tariffs or to stem its
effects by converting specific duties into ad valorem duties.
These findings must, to some extent, change our view of the postwar U.S. trade
liberalization. The bulk of the U. S. tariff reduction was brought about not through the arduous
task of negotiating rate reductions at the bargaining table, but through the silent and gradual
erosion of specific tariffs through inflation. Although this erosion was permitted to run its course
without intefierence, the resulting tariff reductions were not the result of deliberate policy
decisions, but a by-product of the century-old Republican preference for specific over ad valorem
.17
duties that was frozen into the tariff code by the Smoot-Hawley tariff of 1930.
IV. The Antebellum Tariff, 1821-1860
The overwhelming importance of import prices in determining the average tariff in the
century tier the Civil War raises the question of its importance in the antebellum period. Specific
duties were used extensively from the first tariff in 1789 until the Walker tariff of 1846, which
replaced all specific duties with lower ad valorem duties. The tariff act of 1857 retained the
exclusive use of ad valorem duties, although the Merrill tariff of 1861 reintroduced specific duties
in the tariff code. For this reason, import prices were. probably not as important a determinant of
the average tariff in the antebellum period.
Table 5 confirms this suspicion. Using data from 1821-60, regressions similar to those
petiorrned above yield a coefficient on the log of import prices similar to that found for the
century @er the Civil War, but it is statistically insignificant. When the sample period 1821-45 is
considered, the coefficient is -64.5 (with a standard error of 49.2); when the sample period is
1847-60 (when ad valorem duties were used exclusively) the coefficient is -0.3 (with a standard
error of 3.4). This last finding illustrates that import prices are not a source of variation in the
tti when they are comprised of just ad valorem duties.
V. Conclusions and Implications
For most of the century following the Civil War, roughly two-thirds of dutiable U.S.
imports were subject to specific duties whose ad v’alorem equivalent was inversely related to the
level of impofi prices. This paper finds that changes in import prices were three to four times
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more important than changes in the actual rates of import duty in altering the tariff over the
course of the century. Tariff changes were not determined as much by the policy actions of
legislators and negotiators, but by fluctuations in import prices. One possible reason for the
benign neglect of policymakers is that changes in import prices were pushing the tariff in the same
direction as policy. The deflation of the early 1920s and 1930s coincides with the higher tariff
rates in the Fordney-McCumber and Smoot-Hawley tariffs, while the inflation from the mid-1 930s
coincides with a trade agreements program designed to reduce tariffs. Policymakers did not need
to take actions offsetting the effects of import prices on the tariff because price movements did
not cotiict with the direction in which policy was pushing tariff rates.
“Tariff cycles,” the negative correlation between the tariff and the business cycle, is an
empirical regularity in the literature on the political economy of trade policy (see, for example,
Bohara and Kaempfer [199 1]). The standard interpretation is to view the tendency of tariffs to
rise when unemployment rises and real GNP and the GNP deflator fall as reflecting the
endogenous determination of tariff rates in the political market, where politicians are responding
to the pressures of import-competing interests. This paper implies that this correlation is not
entirely the result from political pressures that endogenously determine the tariff (particularly
since the tariff was changed only every seven years, on average, between 1865 and 1930), but
more from the use of specific duties which automatically gives rise to this phenomena. Thus, the
tariff cycle partly reflects a form of “path dependence” in which a political choice was made
decades ago to favor specific rather than ad valorem rates of duty as the principal method of
levying taxes on imports.19
Data Appendix
Average Tariff (tariff revenue as share of dutiable imports):
1821-1970, series U 212 from U.S. Bureau of the Census (1975).
1971-73, from U.S. Bureau of the Census (1974), p. 801.
Import Prices (unit value of imports):
1821-1860, from North (1960), pp. 607-608.
1865-1878, from Simon (1960), p. 652.
1879-1970, series U 238 from U.S. Bureau of the Census (1975).
1971-1973, from U.S. Bureau of the Census (1974), p. 791.
Wholesale Prices:
1821-1889, series E 52 from U.S. Bureau of the Census (1975).
1890-1970, series E 23 from U.S. Bureau of the Census (1975).
1971-1973, fi-om U.S. Bureau of the Census (1974), p. 407.
Years of Tariff Acts:
1821-1930, from Taussig (1931). ,20
Table 1: Specific Duties in U.S. Imports
Year ShareofDutiableImports ShareofTariffRevenue EquivalentAd Source
subjectto specificor from Valorem Rate of
compound duty specific and compound Specific Duties
duties
1867 55,5 58.0 N.A. McGuire
(1990, p. 635)
1876 63.4 46.3 N.A. Ibid.
1913 63,3 42.8 23.5 USTC
(1924, p. 14)
1914 42.2 51.8 43.1 Ibid.
1920 69.0 45.7 10.5 fiid,
1925 64.9 64.8 35.8 USTC(1927)
1939 67 N.A. N.A. Durand
(1964,P. 14)
1951 75 N.A. N.A. ~id,
1964 52.2 N.A. N.A. USTC (1966)
1972 37.0 26.1 5.9 Van Cott and Wipf
(1983, p. 729)
Note: Data for 1913 are for the fiscal year when the 1909 tariff was in effect. Data for 1914 are when for
the Underwood tariff was in effect.
.21
Table 2: Determinants of the Average Ad Valorem U.S. Tariff Rate
DependentVariable:TariffRevenue/Dutiable ImportsX 100.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS OLS Iv IV-GLS
Constant 47.51 128.87 135.9 91.63
(0.63) (6.68) (8.82) (6.54)
Log Of -. -20.91 -22.71 -22.53
Import Price (1.71) (2.21) (2.42)
Act of 1872 -5.48 -6.41 -6.49 -5.48
(0.91) (0.96) (1.04) (1.56)
Act of 1883 -2.46 -6.47 -6.81 -5.73
(1.01) (1.01) (1.17) (1.75)
McKinley (1890) -0.05 -4.22 -4.58 -3.42
(1.25) (1.29) (1.42) (2.10)
Wilson-German -5.92 -13.23 -13.86 -12.19
(1894) (0.88) (1.07) (1.34) (1.66)
Dingley (1897) 0.13 -5.29 -5.76 -5.14
(1.19) (1.13) (1.31) (1.80)
Payne-Aldrich -5.96 -9.38 -9.67 -8.89
(1909) (0.85) (0.82) (0.99) (1.75)
Underwood (1913) -18.95 -15.32 -15.01 -13.72
(2.61) (1.24) (1.23) (2.05)
Fordney-McCumber -9.34 -5.42 -5.09 -4.62
(1922) (0.79) (1.04) (1.07) (1.77)
Smoot-Hawley 2.51 -6.43 -7.20 -6.79
(1930) (2.55) (2.21) (2.51) (2.77)
RTAA (1936) -14.58 -16.64 -16.82 -15.62
(1.91) (0.94) (1.02) (1.65)
GATT (1948) -35.44 -21.60 120.41 -19.59
(0.65) (1.42) (1.57) (2.19)
Kennedy Round -37.66 -19.42 -17.85 -18.18
(1968) (0.79) (1.78) (2.01) (2.53)
Adj .R’ 0.94 0.98 0.98 0.96
DW 1.06 1.33 1.34 1.63
W: Ti.rneperiod: 1865-1973. N=109. The mean ofthe dependentvariable is 34.13. Standard emors (corrected
for heterskedasticity) in parenthesis.23
Table 4: Contribution of Regressors to Major U.S. Tariff Changes
rime Actual Fitted Tariff Acts Import Prices
‘enod Tariffs Tariffs Alone Alone
(importprices (tariffactsconstant)
constant)
1873- Percentage +38 +20 +1 +19
[899 Change
Fraction 100 54 4 51
Explained
1899- Percentage -69 -66 -20 -47
1920 Change
Fraction 100 96 29 68
Explained
1920- Percentage +260 +223 +46 +180
1932 Change
Fraction 100 86 17 69
Explained
1932- Percentage -80 -80 -23 -56
1954 Change
Fraction 100 99 29 70
Explained
1945- Percentage -60 -62 -13 -49
1967 Change
Fraction 100 108 22 86
Explained
Note: Figures may not add due to rounding.24
Table 5: Determinants of the Average Ad Valorem U.S. Tariff Rate





Log of Import Price .- -21.78
(14.13)
Act of 1824 8.22 5.31
(2.72) (3.02)
Act Of 1828 9.97 4.68
(4.15) (4.95)
Act of 1832 0.23 -6.51
(2.56) (4.86)
Act Of 1833 -6.62 -13.67
(2.95) (5.63)
Act Of 1842 -11.15 -22.00
(3.52) (7.71)
Act Of 1846 -15.52 -26.64
(2.65) (7.32)
Act Of 1857 -21.70 -30.45
(2.68) (6.27)
Adj. R2 0.87 0.86
DW I 2.25 I 2.04 I
~: Time Period: 1821-1860. N=40. Themean ofthe dependentvariable is35.51. Standard






Average Tariff and Import Prices
1865-1973
0 ~,,,l,,,,,,,,,,l,,,,l,,l,,,,l,l,,,l,,,,,,,,,,,l,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,l,,,,l,,l,,,,,,l,,,,,l,,,
1880 1900 1920 1940 1960



















1880 1900 1920 1940 1960




1880 1900 1920 1940 1960
I— Actual Tariff ------ Predicted Tariff I27
References
Anderson, James E., and J. Peter Neary. “Measuring the Restrictiveness of Trade Policy.” ~
Wor~view 8 (1994): 171-190.
Bohara, Alok K., and William H. Kaempfer. “A Test of Tariff Endogeneity in the United
States.” ~ Review 81 (September 1991): 952-960.
Crucini, Mario J. “Sources of Variation in Real Tariff Rates: The United States, 1900-1940.”
Revie w 84 (June 1994): 732-743.
Durand, Edward Dana. “The Trade Agreements Program.” Unpublished mss., Washington,
D. C., 1964.
Irwin, Douglas A. “The Smoot-Hawley Tariff A Quantitative Assessment.” NBER Working
Paper No. 5509, March 1996.
Lerdau, E. “On the Measurement of Tariffs: The U.S. Over 40 Years.” ~
10 (May 1957): 232-244.
McGuire, Robert A. “Deflation-Induced Increases in Post-Civil War U.S. Tariffs.” ~
2nd ser. 43 (November 1990): 633-645.
North, Douglass C. “The United States Balance of Payments, 1790- 1860.” In ~
Ec~y in ~, Vol. 24, Studies in Income and Wealth.
Princeton: Princeton University Press for the National Bureau of Economic Research, 1960.
Roessler, Fneder. “Specific Duties, Inflation and Floating Cumencies.” MTT S~-
. .
~, No. 4. Geneva: General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, November 1977.
Simon, Matthew. “The United States Balance of Payments, 1861-1900.” In ~
v In ~, Vol. 24, Studies in Income and Wealth,
Princeton: Princeton University Press for the National Bureau of Economic Research, 1960.
Taussig, Frank W. ~ of the lJ~. 8th ed. New York: G. P. Putnam,
1931.
U.S. Bureau of the Census. ~s of the ~.
. .
Bicentennial Edition. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1975.
U.S. Bureau of the Census. ~t of the 1J~ 1974. (95th cd.)
Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1974.28
U.S. Congress. Senate Committee on Finance. ~ Senat~u~
l_8&8_,~L–18X. Senate Document No, 547. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing
Office, 1909.
U.S. Congress. House Committee on Ways and Means. A13ill to ~
. House Report No. 5.
Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1913.
U.S. Tariff Commission. ~ of T~. Washington, D.C.: Government
Printing Office, 1924.
U.S. Tariff Commission. “Tariff Act of 1922: Rates of Duty Reduced to Equivalent Ad Valorem
Rates,” Tariff Commission Reports 1927a.
U.S. Tariff Commission. ~ of ~ Program. Jti@ 934 to Ap~,
E!iut L S~. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1948.
U.S. Tariff Cornrnission. “U.S. tariff rates by type: Percentage distribution of free, specific, and
ad valorem rates based on value of imports, number of invoices, and number of Items in the tariff
schedules.” Internal Memo, July 1966.
Van Cott, T. Norman, and Larry J. Wipf. “Tariff Reduction via Inflation: U.S. Specific Tariffs,
1972-79.” Wel~ “ 119 (1983): 724-733.